Authors: Soo Hyun Lee (King's College London) & Timo Fleckenstein (London School of Economics) | Journal: Journal of Contemporary Asia, Vol. 56, 2026 | DOI: 10.1080/00472336.2026.2650155 | Published online: 17 October 2025
Keywords: Civil Society, Democratic Backsliding, Imperial President, South Korea, Political Parties, Martial Law
Abstract
"South Korean democracy had been under attack. This was most apparent in President Yoon Suk-Yeol's attempt to impose martial law. But it was not the only challenge to Korean democracy, previously regarded as one of the most successful third-wave democracies. Though not calling into question episodes of democratic regression, this article challenges arguments of Korean democracy backsliding and instead points to the country's democratic rollercoaster: ascent under progressive leadership followed by sharp decline under right-wing administrations. Democratic resilience is also evidenced in civil society mobilisation and popular uprisings in democratic crises, and the rise of programmatic party competition has been vital in democratic consolidation. Significant achievements notwithstanding, [the article] proposes an institutionalist account of democratic stagnation in Korea that puts centre-stage constitutional flaws of the political system and the chaebol-dominated economy."
Background and Context
South Korea had long been regarded internationally as a poster child of democratic transition — a third-wave democracy that successfully moved from military dictatorship to a consolidated liberal democracy following the 1987 popular uprising. For decades, it served as evidence that Asian countries could sustain stable multiparty systems, free elections, judicial independence, and a vibrant civil society alongside rapid economic modernisation.
This reputation made the events of December 3, 2024 all the more shocking: sitting President Yoon Suk-yeol declared martial law on national television, citing the need to root out "anti-state" and "pro-North Korean forces" among the parliamentary opposition. Troops were deployed to the National Assembly to prevent lawmakers from assembling. The decree was rejected unanimously within hours by 190 members of the National Assembly — including members of Yoon's own People Power Party — and was lifted after approximately six hours. Citizens mobbed the parliament building to physically resist military forces. Yoon was subsequently impeached, arrested, tried, and convicted — sentenced to five years in prison in January 2026, with the insurrection charge proceeding separately.
This episode triggered a major academic and policy debate: was South Korea experiencing democratic backsliding in a systemic sense? Lee and Fleckenstein's article intervenes directly in this debate.
Central Argument: The Democratic Rollercoaster
The article's central thesis is that framing South Korea through the lens of democratic "backsliding" — the dominant framework used for Hungary, Turkey, Poland, or Brazil — is analytically misleading and empirically inaccurate. Instead, the authors propose the concept of a "democratic rollercoaster" to better capture the pattern: significant advances under progressive administrations, followed by sharp institutional regression under right-wing governments, but not a linear, cumulative slide toward autocracy.
The key distinction the authors draw is between episodic democratic regression and systemic backsliding. Backsliding implies a directional and cumulative degradation of democratic institutions — the erosion of checks and balances, courts, press freedom, and civil society over time. The authors argue Korea does not fit this pattern. Instead, they point to evidence of democratic resilience: the rapid mobilisation of civil society against Yoon's martial law attempt; the role of the National Assembly in checking executive overreach; massive public protests demanding presidential accountability (mirroring the 2016–17 Candlelight Revolution that removed Park Geun-hye); and the strength of programmatic political party competition.
Key Arguments
1. The Democratic Rollercoaster Pattern
The article maps Korean democracy over successive administrations, identifying a cyclical pattern: progressive presidencies (Kim Dae-jung, Roh Moo-hyun, Moon Jae-in) generally advanced democratic standards — civil liberties, judicial independence, decentralisation — while right-wing administrations (Lee Myung-bak, Park Geun-hye, Yoon Suk-yeol) presided over pronounced regression. The authors note that democratic indicators consistently recover after each right-wing administration, distinguishing Korea's trajectory from genuine backsliding where erosion is cumulative and self-reinforcing.
2. Democratic Resilience Through Civil Society
A major piece of evidence is the repeated demonstration of civil society's capacity to defend democracy from below. The 2016–17 Candlelight Protests resulted in the unprecedented democratic removal of a sitting president (Park Geun-hye) via constitutionally prescribed impeachment and subsequent conviction. The response to Yoon's 2024 martial law attempt demonstrated a similar pattern. The authors treat this as evidence of robust democratic institutionalisation at the societal level — Korean citizens possess strong democratic consciousness and willingness to defend democratic norms through collective action.
3. Rise of Programmatic Party Competition
The article points to the development of relatively programmatic (rather than purely clientelist or personality-driven) party competition in South Korea. Korean parties have gradually developed more coherent ideological identities — a progressive bloc anchored in the Democratic Party and a conservative bloc in the People Power Party. This has created conditions for meaningful electoral alternation and policy debate, unlike democracies where party systems are fragmented or entirely personalised around individual leaders.
4. Constitutional Flaws: The Imperial Presidency
The authors' most original contribution is an institutionalist account of "democratic stagnation" rather than backsliding. They argue that Korea's constitutional architecture — specifically the combination of a powerful single-term (five-year, non-renewable) presidency, a majoritarian winner-takes-all electoral system, and the dominance of the chaebol-centred economy — creates structural incentives for polarisation, executive overreach, and political dysfunction.
The non-renewable single term means presidents face no accountability to future voters once elected; they become lame ducks almost from inauguration, creating incentives for immediate consolidation of power. The absence of robust mechanisms for executive-legislative power sharing under divided government means that when opposition parties control the National Assembly (as occurred dramatically in the 2024 legislative elections, where the Democratic Party won nearly 60% of seats), governance becomes almost impossible.
5. Chaebol Economy and Democratic Limitations
The article integrates political economy into its institutionalist account by pointing to the structural power of the chaebol (large conglomerate family businesses) as a constraint on democratic deepening. The chaebol have historically maintained intimate connections with both conservative and progressive administrations, resist redistributive policies, and shape key economic governance decisions. The authors argue this structural economic power limits the scope of meaningful democratic competition over economic policy and contributes to the legitimacy crisis — particularly given rising inequality, housing costs, and youth unemployment.
6. Constitutional Reform as the Priority
The article concludes with a clear reform agenda: fundamental constitutional reform that recalibrates the relationship between the executive and the legislature is imperative. The authors propose that the priority objective should be strengthening the party-political system — giving parties genuine institutional roles in government formation, coalition building, and policy making that can buffer the extremes of presidentialism. The single five-year non-renewable term, they argue, should be reformed.
Methodology
The article is primarily a qualitative, comparative-historical and institutionalist analysis. It draws on: systematic review of democratic indices (V-Dem, Freedom House, Bertelsmann Transformation Index); comparative analysis of Korea within the broader literature on democratic backsliding, third-wave democracies, and presidential systems; historical analysis of constitutional development and key political episodes (the 1987 transition, the 1997 financial crisis, the Park and Yoon impeachments); and secondary literature on Korean political economy, civil society, and party systems.
Significance
The article makes an important intervention against a growing literature that categorises South Korea as a backsliding democracy on par with other authoritarian-leaning cases. It argues this misclassification obscures both the genuine resilience of Korean democracy and the specific structural reforms needed. Published in the Journal of Contemporary Asia — the leading scholarly journal on Asian politics and political economy — the article contributes to regional comparative democratisation debates while offering a case-specific institutionalist explanation for patterns of democratic progress and regression.
This article summary is prepared by the IOCSS Journal Monitor. The original article is available at tandfonline.com. IOCSS monitors the Journal of Contemporary Asia as part of its global political economy watch programme.